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The Use of Rewards to Increase and Decrease Trust: Mediating Processes and Differential Effects 
Abstract 
We test hypotheses asserting that reward structures - an omnipresent element of the work context 
- have a strong influence on interpersonal trust, and we explore the cognitive and behavioral routes through 
which the effects may occur. Specifically, we use attribution theory to identify several core processes 
including social perception (causal schemas), self-perception, and attributional biases (correspondence 
bias, suspicion effects, and pre-existing expectations) that may explain trust development. A 3 
(cooperative/competitive/mixed rewards) X 2 (high/low initial trust) experimental design in a problem-
solving task was used to examine the hypotheses. The results suggest that reward structures have a strong 
influence on trust, and that the effect is mediated by causal schemas, suspicion effects, and self-
perception. We also found some support for the prediction that the impact of mixed reward structures on 
trust is biased by individuals’ pre-existing expectations about their partner’s trustworthiness. The theory 
and results suggest that attribution theory provides a useful framework for understanding the complex, 
diverse, and multiple routes through which trust may develop.  
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The degree of trust an individual has in a work partner has been shown to directly or indirectly 
affect a number of work outcomes such as individuals’ work performance, organizational citizenship 
behaviors, organizational commitment, turnover intentions, satisfaction, and group performance (Dirks and 
Ferrin, 2001; In Press; Kramer, 1999). Perhaps as a consequence, researchers have demonstrated 
significant interest in the development of interpersonal trust. Several theoretical articles have focused 
principally or entirely on the antecedents of interpersonal trust (e.g., McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany, 
1998; Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and Werner, 1998). And while empirical research has lagged behind 
theory, empirical work has been conducted for some antecedents. In particular, interpersonal trust can be 
predicted by various leadership (e.g., Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, and Fetter, 1990) and 
communication (e.g., Butler and Cantrell, 1994) behaviors performed by trustees, trustors’ perceptions of 
procedural justice (e.g., Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza, 1995), and organizational trust-building 
interventions (e.g., Zand, Steele, and Zalking, 1969). Although this research is an excellent beginning, a 
more complete understanding of trust development requires identifying other factors that may influence 
trust, and developing theoretical frameworks to understand the processes through which the factors 
operate.  
In this article we will develop and test hypotheses asserting that reward structures have a strong 
influence on interpersonal trust, and we will explore the cognitive and behavioral routes through which the 
effects may occur. In doing so, we will attempt to develop insight into the complex process of trust 
development by investigating several attributional processes that may be simultaneously set in motion by a 
contextual variable such as rewards. We also note that, from a practical standpoint, reward structures may 
have more potential as a tool for intervention than most of the variables that have been previously 
examined as antecedents of interpersonal trust. Reward structures are omnipresent in work organizations, 
and are a crucial and often flexible means through which employees are motivated and resources are 
allocated. In contrast, trust-building activities and related interventions such as team-building are expensive 
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to implement organization-wide and have been found to have mixed effectiveness (Woodman and 
Sherwood, 1980). Similarly, initiatives aimed at changing individuals’ communication and leadership 
behaviors can be expensive and can meet with mixed results because long-term behavior changes are 
difficult to achieve, and efforts are frequently thwarted by structural or contextual variables (e.g., reward 
systems). Hence, for practical as well as theoretical reasons, it is important for organizational researchers 
to develop a fuller understanding of the effects of rewards on interpersonal trust. 
Theoretical Foundations  
We will focus on trust development in dyadic relationships in which the primary task is joint 
problem solving. Joint problem-solving activities are central to many organizational phenomena and 
theories (e.g., participative leadership, negotiation, decision making). Individuals engaged in joint problem 
solving are interdependent because they must share and integrate information. Yet they are also at risk 
because as one contributes information and effort to the problem-solving task, one’s partner may not 
reciprocate. Since interdependence and risk are recognized as the two necessary preconditions of trust 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998), this is a context in which trust is likely to be relevant. 
We will use Cummings and Bromiley’s (1996) conceptual and operational definition of 
interpersonal trust: an individual’s belief that another individual makes efforts to uphold commitments, is 
honest, and does not take advantage given the opportunity.1 This definition was designed to assess trust 
perceptions in contexts involving potential competition and cooperation between two parties, and therefore 
seems appropriate for capturing trust-related phenomena in the present study.  
Reward structures refer to the basis upon which rewards are distributed to two or more 
individuals. Following Deutsch’s (1949b) work, researchers (e.g., Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Tjosvold, 
1984) have examined reward and goal structures of two “pure” types: Rewards based solely on joint 
performance are “cooperative,” and provide an incentive for individuals to work together because it is in 
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their common interest to perform well; rewards based solely on the performance of one individual relative 
to another are “competitive,” individuals are rewarded for outperforming their partner, hence it is in their 
interest to behave competitively. These two types can be combined to form a “mixed” structure that 
includes both cooperative and competitive rewards. 
Attribution Theory  
The primary objective of our study is to examine whether rewards have a direct effect on trust or 
whether, as we suspect, they represent a catalyst that may set in motion other processes that influence 
trust. Fundamental to our analysis is the use of attribution theory to model and examine the behavioral and 
perceptual processes through which rewards may influence trust. Our hypotheses will draw on three core 
attributional processes identified in attribution theory research (e.g., Kelley, 1967): social perception, self-
perception, and attributional biases.  
Attribution theory attempts to understand individuals’ causal explanations for events and 
occurrences, and individuals’ perceptions and judgments of others. Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley 
(1967) formalized and extended many of Heider’s (1958) ideas in the form of their correspondent 
inference and covariance approaches, respectively. These two approaches assume that an individual 
evaluates a relatively large amount of information, for example about multiple persons in multiple situations 
at multiple points in time, to make a single attribution. But researchers soon realized that in many or most 
cases individuals have insufficient time, motivation, or information to engage in this level of information 
processing, and therefore take attributional shortcuts. Specifically, they use their causal schemas – their 
preconceptions about cause-and-effect knowledge (Kelley, 1973) – to make attributions based on limited 
information about person and situation. At about the same time, researchers began to realize that the 
processes of social perception outlined in attribution theory research could also describe self-perception, 
i.e., the processes through which individuals come to know their own internal states (Bem, 1972). Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 Consistent with other recent research (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1998), we have defined trust as a psychological state 
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in more recent years, attribution researchers have directed a great deal of effort toward examining the 
effects of systematic biases, such as the correspondence bias (Gilbert and Malone, 1995), on attributional 
processes. 
Trust development can be viewed as an attributional process. For example, an individual may 
develop beliefs about another person’s trustworthiness based on whether the person’s behavior is judged 
to be caused by internal vs. situational factors (e.g., see Korsgaard, Brodt, and Whitener, 2002). We 
suggest that attribution theory is useful for understanding several important aspects of the trust 
development process. As discussed above, attribution theory describes two distinct but related processes: 
social perception (developing inferences about another person’s internal characteristics, including their 
traits, dispositions, beliefs, states and attitudes, and the reasons for their behavior), and self-perception 
(understanding one’s own internal characteristics, including one’s beliefs and attitudes). These two 
processes are relevant to two fundamental elements of interpersonal trust. Note that trust researchers 
have most often defined and operationalized trust as an individual’s beliefs about another person’s 
characteristics (e.g., Dirks and Ferrin, In Press); this definition assumes that an individual processes 
information and draws inferences about the other person (social perception) and also develops and can 
report an internal belief about his or her level of trust in the person (self-perception). Attribution theory is 
also helpful for understanding another aspect of trust development that researchers have discussed, but 
rarely studied: biases in trust development (e.g., McKnight et al., 1998). Given that a great deal of 
attribution research has focused on the effects of systematic biases on attributional processes, attribution 
theory may also provide insight into biases that occur in trust development. In sum, viewing trust 
development as an attributional process will enable us to draw on very relevant insights from three core 
areas of attribution theory: social perception, self-perception, and attributional biases.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
that is distinct from cooperative or competitive behavior. 
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In this article we will describe how each of these three sets of attributional processes may 
mediate the effect of reward structures on interpersonal trust. The first two hypotheses will draw on two 
attributional biases that may affect trust development: correspondence bias (e.g., Gilbert and Jones, 1986), 
which is one of the most commonly documented attributional biases, and suspicion effects (e.g., Fein, 
1996), which seem particularly relevant to trust development. Hypothesis 3 will draw on Bem’s (1972) 
seminal work to examine how self-perception processes may influence trust development. Hypothesis 4 
will examine social perception processes of trust development, focusing on the causal schema approach 
(Kelley, 1973). Our final hypothesis will examine the biasing effects of pre-existing expectations (i.e., 
schemas) on trust development (Jones, 1990).  
We are not the first researchers to use attribution theory to study trust development (see 
Kruglanski, 1970; Strickland, 1958). However, these studies are few in number, and tend to draw more 
narrowly on attribution theory. One contribution of our article is that we will show how multiple 
perspectives from attribution theory can be used to theoretically model and empirically examine the 
behavioral and perceptual processes of interpersonal trust development. We believe it is important to 
examine these multiple processes simultaneously in order to more fully understand the complex, diverse, 
and multiple routes through which trust may develop. 
Effects of Cooperative and Competitive Reward Structures on Interpersonal Trust 
Prior research suggests that cooperative and competitive reward structures have the potential to 
influence interpersonal trust. Specifically, Tjosvold found that participants performing complex and simple 
tasks (1982) and engaging in participative decision-making (1985) under a cooperative reward structure 
developed a higher level of trust in one another than participants under a competitive reward structure. 
Yet the processes through which these effects occur have not been articulated or examined empirically. 
Thus, we will present and test a theoretical framework that describes the attributional processes through 
which rewards may influence trust, and also identifies some elements of attribution theory that suggest that 
REWARDS AND TRUST     7 
  
rewards may not influence trust. Our objective is to develop a framework that provides insight into the 
specific processes through which rewards may influence trust, and also provides insight into trust 
formation processes more generally.  
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Cognitive and Behavioral Routes through which Reward Structures May Influence Trust 
Correspondence Bias. At the core of attribution theory is the idea that a person’s actions can be 
caused by “personal forces” (those characteristic of the individual, such as the individual’s beliefs, 
attitudes, and dispositions) and/or “environmental forces” (those factors residing outside the individual) 
(Heider, 1958). Heider’s original formulation of attribution theory, and extensions of the theory such as the 
correspondent inference and covariation approaches, all state that if an individual attributes another 
person’s behavior to internal forces, the individual is likely to use the behavior as a source of information 
for making inferences about the person’s internal characteristics. But if the individual attributes the 
person’s behavior to external forces, the information is unlikely to be used to make an inference about the 
person’s internal characteristics. These approaches also suggest that individuals often consider both 
internal and external forces to draw inferences.  
Yet, research on the correspondence bias (e.g., Gilbert and Jones, 1986) suggests that individuals’ 
inferences about other persons’ characteristics and behaviors are frequently and systematically biased. 
The correspondence bias is the tendency of an individual to draw inferences about a person’s internal 
characteristics from behaviors that can be entirely explained by the situations in which they occur (Gilbert 
and Malone, 1995). Several explanations have been offered for this effect. For example, individuals may 
be insufficiently aware of situational constraints on a person’s behavior. And individuals appear to 
conserve cognitive resources by making dispositional inferences first, and then considering situational 
factors only if time and cognitive resources are available to do so (Gilbert and Malone, 1995). While there 
is still some uncertainty about the causes of the bias, there is more agreement about its prominence: The 
bias has been recognized as a particularly robust and repeatable finding in attribution research (Jones, 
1990).  
In the present study, reward structures represent a situational determinant of behavior. 
Researchers have shown that cooperative and competitive rewards have a strong impact on interpersonal 
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behaviors (Johnson and Johnson, 1989). We will focus on interpersonal behaviors that are likely to be 
important in problem-solving interactions as well as relevant to the formation of trusting beliefs: the extent 
to which individuals share critical information, and share information accurately as opposed to being 
deceitful. Cooperative reward structures should motivate individuals to engage in cooperative behaviors 
such as sharing information because doing so is key to joint success and hence the acquisition of rewards. 
In contrast, competitive rewards should motivate individuals to engage in an opposite set of behaviors such 
as withholding information and sharing information inaccurately because these maximize one individual’s 
performance at the expense of the partner. 
Kelley’s (1967) correspondent inference approach suggests that, absent the correspondence bias, 
an individual who observes a partner withholding and distorting information wholly in response to external 
competitive rewards should conclude that the behavior was caused by external rewards rather than the 
partner’s internal trustworthiness (e.g., Jones, Davis, and Gergen, 1961). Thus, reward structures should 
not influence trust via the partner’s behavior. In contrast, research on the correspondence bias suggests 
that the individual may conclude that the partner’s situationally-induced behaviors are indicative of the 
partner’s internal trustworthiness. Thus we predict that a partner’s information-sharing and lying behaviors 
that are wholly caused by external factors will nevertheless influence the individual’s trust in the partner. 
Hypothesis 1. The effect of reward structures on an individual’s trust in a partner is mediated by  
the partner’s completeness and truthfulness in sharing of information. 
Suspicion effects. Recent attribution research by Fein and colleagues (e.g., Fein, 1996) suggests 
an alternative to hypothesis 1. Their work has found that when an individual doubts the motives or 
genuineness of another person’s behavior, the correspondence bias is reduced or eliminated. This occurs 
because individuals who are suspicious engage in more sophisticated attributional processing about the 
person’s behavior. Specifically, they are more likely to devote cognitive resources to the task of correcting 
their initial inferences that behavior reflects the person’s internal factors, and thus they give more 
consideration to situational influences on the person’s behavior. According to these findings, individuals 
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interacting with a partner performing competitive behaviors induced by a competitive or mixed reward 
structure might avoid arriving at negative inferences about the partner’s trustworthiness due to improved 
information processing. Accordingly, hypothesis 1 is less likely to be supported.  
As a complement to the above effect, Fein and Hilton (1994) found that while suspicion may help 
individuals avoid the correspondence bias, suspicion also negatively affects the appraisals that an individual 
makes about the person, and this effect can occur regardless of the person’s behavior. That is, the 
experience of suspicion helps an individual avoid incorrectly attributing a person’s behavior to internal 
rather than situational factors, yet the experience also causes the individual to see the person in a more 
negative light independent of the person’s behavior. This suggests that suspicion about another’s motives 
should cause the individual to develop lower trust in the partner as a direct consequence of the suspicion, 
not the partner’s behavior. We expect that in the joint problem-solving context, suspicion is likely to appear 
in the form of perceptions about the competitive motives that are present in the interaction. Importantly, 
reward structures provide only a stimulus for the development of suspicion; it is the extent to which one 
perceives that competitive motives are present in the interaction that may negatively influence trust.  
Hypothesis 2. The effect of reward structures on an individual’s trust in a partner is 
mediated by the individual’s perception of competitive vs. cooperative motives in the  
interaction. 
Self-Perception. Bem’s (1972) fundamental insight was that many of the processes of social 
perception outlined in attribution theory research could also be used to explain self-perception. According 
to Bem, individuals’ internal states (attitudes, beliefs, dispositions) may correspond with their behaviors 
because individuals use their own past behaviors as a source of information to understand their own 
internal states. That is, “individuals come to ‘know’ their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states 
partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior…” (1972, p. 2). Koller’s (1988) 
field experiment supported the hypothesis that trust may develop via self-perception.  
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Building on the above ideas, a self-perception analysis of interpersonal trust development suggests 
that individuals may form their trusting beliefs in a partner by considering whether their own trust-related 
behaviors with respect to that partner indicate a trusting belief. Specifically, individuals who shared 
information fully and accurately with a partner should form a relatively high level of trust in the partner via 
self-perception, while individuals who withheld information and/or shared information inaccurately should 
form a relatively low level of trust. And, as discussed above, cooperative rewards should influence 
individuals to share information completely and accurately, while competitive rewards should influence 
individuals to withhold information and share it inaccurately. Thus, reward structures may influence 
individuals’ behavior, which individuals may then use as a source of information for inferring their level of 
trust in the partner. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of reward structures on an individual’s trust in a partner is mediated by 
the individual’s own completeness and truthfulness in information sharing. 
Causal Schemas. Kelley (1973) noted that individuals often make attributions based on limited 
information, rather than following the fairly formal guidelines outlined in the correspondent inference and 
covariance approaches. Individuals can make such attributions because they are able use their causal 
schemas, i.e., their preconceptions about cause-and-effect relationships, to draw inferences about the 
causes of behaviors and events. While causal schemas can range from simple beliefs (e.g., “good people 
do good things”) to multiple schemas that might be compared and contrasted as plausible explanations for 
an observed behavior or event, there is evidence that individuals prefer simple schemas over more 
complex schemas. 
A causal schema analysis of trust development suggests that rewards may influence the 
development of interpersonal trust via individuals’ perceptions of their dyad’s performance. Research 
supports both linkages in this causal chain. First, Deutsch (1949a; 1949b) suggested and found that 
cooperative rewards cause individuals to expect their group to have higher performance and functioning 
due to their perceived common fate. These effects are expected to exist aside from any impact on actual 
REWARDS AND TRUST     12 
  
performance. Second, research by Staw (1975) suggests that teams that perceive themselves as 
performing well will develop more positive appraisals of the group, suggesting that they may also develop 
higher levels of trust. At the conclusion of a group task, Staw’s participants were randomly told that their 
group performed either far above average or far below average, and were then asked to report on the 
cohesiveness, communication and motivation that existed in their group. Participants in the high 
performance condition rated their groups higher on these characteristics than did participants in the low 
performance condition, indicating that their appraisals were shaped by their perceptions of group 
performance. 
Hence, in the present study, we expect that reward structures will influence individuals’ 
perceptions of team performance. Then we expect that individuals will conclude that high levels of joint 
performance imply high trust via their causal schemas, for instance reasoning that “High trust leads to high 
performance, and since we’re a high performance team, we must trust each other.” In sum, drawing on 
theories of causal schemas in the attribution process, we predict that reward structures will impact 
perceived performance, which will then impact trust. 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of reward structures on an individual’s trust in a partner is 
mediated by the individual’s perception of the dyad’s performance. 
Initial Expectations. Lastly, we draw on research on schemas and their effects on the attribution 
process to explore the effects of mixed reward structures on trust. In most workplace situations, there is a 
mix of competitive and cooperative rewards, providing people with the opportunity to emphasize certain 
rewards and de-emphasize others (Deutsch, 1949b; Tjosvold, 1984). Yet prior research (Tjosvold, 1982, 
1985) has only examined the effects of “pure” reward structures on trust. Contrary to the presumption 
that mixed reward structures simply combine elements of cooperative and competitive structures and 
therefore should produce trust levels at the midpoint of those produced by cooperative and competitive 
structures, we will propose that schema theory suggests a different, more complex prediction. 
REWARDS AND TRUST     13 
  
Thus far, we have not considered the effects of individuals’ prior knowledge of one another on 
trust development. Addressing this point, Jones (1990) noted that individuals often have pre-existing 
expectations about the other person, typically derived from prior interaction with the person. These 
expectations fill in gaps in information and create “theory-driven” selection, processing, and interpretation 
of information in the attribution process. These expectations are often known as schemas.  
A core prediction of schema theory is that once one associates a person with a particular schema, 
the schema will bias one’s information processing about the person so that information consistent with the 
schema is more likely to be perceived, retained and recalled than information that is inconsistent. This 
reinforcement effect will continue as long as there are not large discrepancies between the information 
and the schema. However, when large discrepancies occur, individuals are likely to modify their schema, 
or perhaps adopt or form a new schema (e.g., Feldman, 1981; Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  
In the present study, we expect that individuals in the high initial trust condition will utilize a 
schema that characterizes their partner as being trustworthy, and this schema will then influence their 
subsequent information processing. High initial trust individuals who are in a cooperative reward condition 
are likely to observe partner behavior that is cooperative and therefore entirely consistent with the 
trustworthy schema. High initial trust individuals in the mixed condition are likely to encounter mixed or 
ambiguous behavior that is not clearly inconsistent with the trustworthy schema, therefore their schema is 
likely to cause them to attend to and interpret behavior in a way that reinforces trust. However high initial 
trust individuals in the competitive condition are likely to encounter partner behavior that is clearly 
inconsistent with the trustworthy schema; these individuals may have to change their schema, probably to 
one that characterizes their partner as untrustworthy. Thus the effects of rewards on trust will be 
nonlinear: Mixed reward structures will produce trust levels more similar to cooperative rewards than 
competitive rewards. The same logic applies, conversely, to individuals in the low initial trust condition: 
Low initial trust individuals in competitive and mixed conditions should attend to and process information in 
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a manner that reinforces their low trust schema, while low initial trust individuals in the cooperative 
condition may observe behavior that contradicts their low trust schema and influences them to adopt a high 
trust schema. Consequently, trust levels in the mixed reward condition will be more similar to those in the 
competitive condition than those in the cooperative condition.  
Hypothesis 5. The level of initial trust will influence the effect of reward structures on 
trust. In high initial trust dyads, trust levels produced by mixed reward structures will be 
more similar to those produced by cooperative reward structures than those produced by 
competitive reward structures. In low initial trust dyads, trust levels produced by mixed 
reward structures will be more similar to those produced by competitive reward structures 
than those produced by cooperative reward structures. 
 
Method 
Following guidance provided by Dobbins, Lane, and Steiner (1988), we chose an experimental 
method and laboratory setting as it improved our ability to examine specific mediating processes, and draw 
conclusions about causality; both issues are critical to our hypotheses. 
Participants 
Upon entering the laboratory, participants (224 upper-division business students) were randomly 
assigned to a computer terminal that would allow them to interact with a partner. Next, each dyad was 
randomly assigned to a high or low trust condition, and then to a cooperative, mixed or competitive reward 
condition. Individuals received extra-credit points in a class for participating.  
Task 
We adapted the moon (e.g., Bottger and Yetton, 1988) and wilderness survival (Marcic, 1995) 
tasks for this study. In these tasks, group members are told they are stranded on the moon or in the 
wilderness, and have a set of items (e.g., water, duct tape) that may help them survive. The objectives are 
to individually and jointly rank the items based on their importance for survival. 
We adapted each of the two tasks by giving one individual in the dyad information about the 
usefulness of one-half of the items (role 1) and the other individual information about the usefulness of the 
other half of the items (role 2). Participants were told the information was to “provide clues on the use and 
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importance of each particular item within this environment.” We also provided ancillary information about 
each item that participants could use to mislead their partner about the importance of an item if they 
wished to do so. Hence, joint performance depended on the participants analyzing and sharing important 
information and not misleading each other with untruthful information.  
We selected the moon and wilderness survival tasks for several reasons. First, these types of 
tasks have frequently been used in experimental research on joint problem solving (e.g., Bottger and 
Yetton, 1988; Littlepage, Schmidt, Whisler, and Frost, 1995), and are used extensively to train executives 
in joint problem solving. This acceptance by the practitioner community suggested that the tasks would be 
relatively high in experimental realism, and were more likely to produce externally valid findings. Indeed, 
participants displayed numerous indicators of being engaged in the task and wanting to perform well. For 
example, they began strategizing and communicating immediately and rarely stopped until time ran out; 
they cooperated with, competed with, and/or lied to their partners, displayed concerns over being taken 
advantage of by their partner, and demonstrated anger and feelings of violation when they felt they had 
been. Second, we wished to use participants’ behavioral experiences in an initial task as a basis for 
inducing them into a high or low level of initial trust, so that we could then analyze the joint effects of 
reward structures and initial trust on interpersonal trust levels in a second task that was nearly identical in 
nature. Hence, the correspondence between tasks allowed the participants’ trust to transfer most 
effectively across situations.  
Procedure  
In order to enhance experimental realism, participants worked with other participants (as opposed 
to interacting with a confederate). Participants were seated at different terminals and communicated via a 
commercial group problem-solving software program. Participants knew they were working with a 
partner, but could not see the partner and did not know the partner’s identity. We chose this medium 
because it helped eliminate a number of possible confounds such as assessments of similarity, 
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attractiveness, and liking, and nonverbal signals of trustworthiness, each of which could independently 
affect perceptions, behavior and/or trust. Additionally, it allowed us to keep an exact record of the dyads’ 
problem-solving processes. A strict schedule was kept, so that each dyad was given an identical amount of 
time for each segment of the experiment. 
After receiving instructions and answers to any questions, the participants interacted with their 
partner on the moon survival task, ranking the survival items first as a dyad, then as individuals. 
Participants were then told that they would be working with their partner on a similar task – wilderness 
survival – but this time they would be scored and rewarded based on their performance. (There were no 
stated rewards for the moon survival task). At this point, participants were given information about the 
wilderness survival task and the scoring system (manipulation of reward structures) that would be used.  
Immediately prior to commencement of the wilderness survival task, two things happened: 
Participants were given feedback about their partner’s behavior in the moon survival exercise (this was 
the trust manipulation and will be described below), and they were asked to fill out a short questionnaire 
that included the manipulation checks. Participants then worked together on the wilderness survival task, 
provided joint and then individual rankings, and completed a second questionnaire. At the conclusion of the 
study, participants received an immediate debriefing, including a disclosure of the false feedback. 
Two steps recommended by Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, and Gonzales (1990) were taken to 
minimize demand characteristics so that, if demand characteristics existed, they would not be related to the 
variables of interest. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to “understand problem 
solving in computer-mediated communication” in order to disguise our true interest in the effects of 
rewards on trust. And, we specifically asked participants to provide their honest responses and natural 
behavior, as opposed to trying to meet any perceived expectations of the researchers.  
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Trust and Reward Structure Manipulations  
We provided participants with false feedback about their partner’s behavior in the moon survival 
task in order to induce dyads into a state of relative high or low initial trust consistent with the conceptual 
definition of trust above. A researcher examined the transcripts of the moon survival task within view of 
the participants. Then the researcher gave a brief handwritten report to participants in the high trust 
condition indicating that their partner had (a) shared all relevant information and (b) shared the information 
accurately. Participants in the low trust condition received a report indicating that their partner had (a) 
withheld critical information and (b) shared some information inaccurately (i.e., lied). To make the reports 
more believable, each report listed specific examples, drawn from the transcripts, of the 
accuracies/inaccuracies and shared/withheld information. (The moon survival task was adapted so that the 
researcher could realistically portray information utilized in the task as accurate or inaccurate). 
The three reward structures were derived from definitions commonly accepted in the literature 
(e.g., Tjosvold, 1984). Individuals in the cooperative reward condition were told that their score would be 
based upon the performance (accuracy of ranking) of their dyad. Individuals in the competitive reward 
condition were told that their score would be based upon their performance relative to their partner’s 
performance. And individuals in the mixed reward condition were told that half of their score would be 
based upon the performance of their dyad and the other half of their score would be based on their 
individual performance relative to their partner’s individual performance. The instructions were provided in 
written form. As an incentive, participants were informed that the highest-scoring participants would be 
included in a lottery to win $75. 
Measures 
Manipulation Checks. Two categorical multiple-choice questions were used to check the reward 
structure manipulation. These and all other items are detailed in the appendix. A two-way cross-tabulation 
of participants’ responses to the two questions indicated that they were strongly related (c2 (9, N = 224) = 
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379.11, p < .001), providing evidence of reliability. The trust manipulation was checked with a five-item 
scale adapted from Cummings and Bromiley (1996) (a = .93).  
Chi-square analyses of responses to the two reward manipulation check questions revealed 
significant differences across reward conditions. For question 1, c2 (6, N = 224) = 294.90, p < .001, 86% 
of the responses accurately reflected the reward condition; for question 2, c2 (6, N = 224) = 299.69, p < 
.001, 86% of the responses accurately reflected the reward condition; 90% of participants answered at 
least one question correctly. Chi-square analyses of responses to the two reward manipulation check 
questions revealed no significant differences across trust condition (c2 (3, N = 224) = 1.35 and 0.67 for 
questions 1 and 2, respectively, ns), indicating that the trust manipulation did not have any unintended 
effect on the reward manipulation check.  
A 3 X 2 full factorial ANOVA conducted on the trust check yielded a main effect for trust 
condition, F(1, 218) = 153.35, (p < .001), with participants in the high trust condition reporting higher levels 
of trust (M = 29.69, SD = 5.29) than those in the low trust condition (M = 18.88, SD = 7.78). Reward 
condition also had a significant, unintended effect on the trust check F(2, 218) = 4.59 (p < .05) (Mcompetitive 
= 22.96, SD = 8.39; Mmixed = 24.07, SD = 8.05; Mcooperative = 25.69, SD = 9.06). The interaction term was 
insignificant. Since the unintended effect of rewards was much smaller (omega squared = .019) than the 
intended effect of trust (omega squared = .401), the statistical significance of the unintended effect should 
not be of great concern (Perdue and Summers, 1986). Finally, we noted that there were no substantial 
differences in the manipulation check reliabilities or results across role 1 and role 2. 
Behavioral Mediators. We followed procedures that have been outlined in the literature on 
coding social interactions and group processes (Weingart, 1997) to develop reliable, objective measures of 
the actual behaviors occurring in the wilderness survival task. We first developed a coding scheme 
comprising three codes: “responding” = sharing information in response to a request for information; 
“volunteering” = sharing information without being requested to do so; and “lying” = sharing information 
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inaccurately. We then trained a coder who was blind to the conditions and hypotheses. The coder first 
“unitized” the data by breaking the discussions into the smallest units that had logical meaning. Each unit 
was then assigned a code, and the number of occurrences of each code was tallied for each member of 
each dyad. Hence, the responding, volunteering and lying scores for each individual represent the number 
of times the individual performed each act during the wilderness survival exercise.  
One author independently coded a subset of the data so that inter-rater reliability could be checked 
at the beginning and end of the coding process. Guetzkow’s U (1950), a reliability index that measures 
disagreement in unitizing, was acceptable at both times: .03 and .03. Cohen’s kappa (1960), an inter-rater 
reliability index that measures agreement in coding the unitized process data, adjusted for chance 
agreement, was also acceptable at both times: .86 and .93. The responding and volunteering items were 
then summed to form an “information sharing” score for each individual.  
Perceptual Mediators. Four items were adapted from Alper, Tjosvold, and Law (1998) to 
measure perceived motives in the wilderness survival task. Perceived performance was measured with 
two questions adapted from Alper et al. (1998). Since we were interested in participants’ perceived 
performance, we did not give them any feedback on actual performance on either of the two tasks.  
Actual Performance. Consistent with other studies (e.g., Littlepage et al., 1995), this control 
variable was calculated as the sum of differences between the group’s and an expert’s rankings for each 
of the items. The sum was subtracted from a constant so that higher scores reflect better performance. 
Dependent Variable . Trust was measured at the conclusion of the wilderness survival exercise, 
using the same 5-item scale (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996) used to check the trust manipulation.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics, intercorrelations and reliability coefficients are provided in Table 1. We used 
effects coding (Cohen and Cohen, 1983) to create the reward structure variables for the correlation and 
regression analyses, thus the three reward conditions are represented in the regression equations by two 
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effects coding variables. In order to avoid nonindependence of observations, we only used data provided 
by one member of each dyad (role 1 participants; N = 112). 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity . A confirmatory factor analysis of the mediator and 
dependent variables (perceived motives, information sharing, lying, perceived performance, trust) indicated 
a relatively good fit and supported convergent validity for a five-factor model (C2 = 116.48, df = 69, p < 
.001; GFI = .88, CFI = .96, NFI = .91, RMSEA = .079, all item-factor loadings ³ |.46| (p < .001)). We 
noted high correlations among perceived motives, perceived performance, and trust. A series of 
discriminant analyses (Bagozzi and Phillips, 1982) fixed one, two or all three of the possible correlations 
among these three latent factors in the five-factor model at 1.0, and then employed a C2 difference test on 
the values in the unconstrained vs. each of the constrained models. In all cases the C2 of the 
unconstrained model was significantly lower (p < .001 for C2difference) than that of the constrained model, 
supporting the discriminant validity of the constructs. 
Mediator Hypotheses. The Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure was used to examine the extent 
to which the effect of reward structures on trust was mediated by participants’ attributions regarding their 
partners’ behaviors (H1); perceived motives (H2); their own behaviors (H3); and/or perceived 
performance (H4) (see Table 2). In step 1, we regressed the mediator variables on the independent 
variable (reward condition). In all cases, the mediator was significantly predicted by both reward variables. 
(Note also that in steps 1a & 1b, partner behavior was wholly attributable to reward condition (reflecting a 
situational factor) and not the initial trust condition (reflecting an internal factor), a necessary condition for 
testing the correspondence bias hypothesis). In step 2, we regressed the dependent variable (trust) on the 
independent variable; all variables were significant predictors. Finally, in step 3 we regressed the 
dependent variable on the mediator and independent variables and noted the following: First, reward 
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condition was no longer a significant predictor of trust, and the magnitude of the betas decreased 
substantially (-.41 to -.03; .37 to .08), indicating that the effects were fully mediated. Second, partner’s 
information sharing and lying behaviors were not significant predictors of trust, indicating no support for 
hypothesis 1; perceived motives and perceived performance were significant predictors of trust, supporting 
hypotheses 2 and 4; and own information sharing but not own lying were significant predictors of trust, 
providing partial support for hypothesis 3. These results are summarized in Figure 1. Finally, the relatively 
high R2 (.63) suggests a low likelihood of erroneous conclusions due to an underspecified model.  
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Interaction Hypothesis. Step 4 presents the results of a moderated regression examining whether 
the effects of rewards are contingent on initial trust. The significance of one of the interaction terms (b = 
.14; p < .05 for initial trust x cooperative rewards) suggested the presence of an interaction (Aiken and 
West, 1991). To further investigate the effect, we plotted the mean levels of trust across the three reward 
conditions for individuals in the high trust condition, and then for individuals in the low trust condition. The 
pattern of results in the high trust condition was consistent with our prediction: Trust levels in the mixed 
condition (mean = 28.11) were more similar to trust levels in the cooperative condition (mean = 32.11) 
than in the competitive condition (mean = 23.11). However, the plot for the low trust condition was 
inconsistent with our prediction: Trust levels in the mixed condition (mean = 22.53) were more similar to 
those in the cooperative condition (mean = 24.86), rather than being more similar to those in the 
competitive condition (mean = 18.56). Thus hypothesis 5 received mixed support. 
Research Implications   
In this article we used attribution theory to model and examine the perceptual and behavioral 
routes through which reward structures may influence trust. We found full or partial support for 
hypotheses suggesting that rewards influence trust via social perception (causal schemas) and self-
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perception, and that trust development is also influenced by attributional biases (suspicion, and schema 
effects). Our theory and findings highlight the usefulness of attribution theory for understanding trust 
development, including the multiple attributional processes that operate simultaneously to influence a single 
variable such as trust.  
As discussed at the outset, reward structures are a powerful element of the organizational context, 
and represent a potentially useful tool for managers who wish to change employees’ behaviors, 
perceptions and beliefs. While the ability of rewards to change employees’ behavior is well recognized, we 
believe managers as well as researchers do not fully appreciate and are unable to anticipate the other 
important effects that rewards may have – on perceptions, and ultimately on trust. Attribution theory is 
highly useful for anticipating such effects, as the theory recognizes the powerful influence that context 
may have on behavior, it examines the processes through which individuals assess the influence of context 
on their own and others’ behavior, and it enables the researcher to predict the beliefs and inferences that 
individuals will form based on their assessments.  
We examined several specific attributional processes that were set in motion by a single 
contextual variable, rewards. We hope that our findings spur future research into other attribution 
processes that could be influenced by rewards, and other contextual variables that could influence trust 
development via attribution. For example, our theoretical framework and findings identified some key 
routes through which trust may develop: actual behavior, perceived motives and perceived performance. 
Scholars interested in identifying other antecedents of trust may find it worthwhile to focus on 
interventions or variables that influence these processes. For example, they might focus on goal structures 
that influence behavior, elements of organization culture that influence perceived motives, or positive 
feedback and “planned wins” that influence perceived performance. 
One mediator hypothesis did not receive support. Reward structures influenced partner’s 
behavior, but these effects were not transmitted to trust, providing no support for the correspondence bias 
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hypothesis (hypothesis 1). As anticipated in hypothesis 2, this may be because individuals engaged in 
sophisticated attributional processing due to suspicion effects, attributing their partners’ behavior to 
situational rather than internal factors. This result may also be due to the fact that in our study, as in many 
actual work situations, participants may have had difficulty ascertaining, and little opportunity to verify, 
whether their partners were sharing information completely and/or accurately.  
Our finding that, in the mixed reward condition, the effect of rewards on trust was influenced by 
the level of pre-existing trust may have implications for cooperation theory research. Cooperation theory 
research generally focuses on the effects of ‘pure’ cooperative or competitive reward structures despite 
the recognition that in the real world mixed structures predominate (Deutsch, 1949b; Tjosvold, 1984). Our 
research indicates that when situations are equally weighted with cooperative and competitive rewards, 
elements of the situation such as pre-existing trust may cause people to emphasize one of the pure 
rewards over the other. 
As noted earlier, an experimental method and laboratory setting were chosen to provide a stronger 
basis for drawing conclusions about causality and to enable us to effectively measure and investigate the 
four hypothesized mediating processes. It also allowed us to reduce or eliminate a number of possible 
confounds such as perceptions of similarity, institutional and dispositional sources of trust, and cooperation 
norms. These objectives would have been very challenging to accomplish in a field setting, particularly 
since reward structures within organizations have a historic context, and are based on numerous external 
and internal business and management considerations, any number of which could have confounding 
effects on individuals’ perceptions, behavior, and/or trust.  
 However, the method and setting also raise a concern about external validity. Several factors may 
limit the severity of this concern. A meta-analysis by De Vader, Bateson, and Lord (1986) provides direct 
evidence that studies of attribution processes conducted in the laboratory and in the field tend to produce 
very similar results, with the authors suggesting that results tend to generalize across settings. Within our 
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particular study we used several practices to attempt to maximize the potential for external validity. 
Specifically, we selected survival simulations as our experimental tasks in part because they are used 
extensively by corporate trainers to train managers in joint problem-solving (see for example Dyer, 1977; 
Skopec and Smith, 1997). This suggests that our experimental tasks reproduced essential elements of joint 
problem solving relevant to organizations. We also designed the experiment so that it contained the two 
elements that Rousseau et al. (1998) noted are essential for the development of trust – risk and 
interdependence. Including such essential elements has been recommended for enhancing external validity 
(Locke, 1986).  
Finally, we examined trust development in computer-mediated dyadic relationships. To be 
conservative, our findings may be most applicable to virtual interpersonal relationships, which are 
increasingly prevalent and in which scholars have asserted that trust is crucial (e.g., Cascio, 2000). 
However, our theorizing was not limited to the virtual context, and dyads are a building block of larger 
groups, suggesting that our results may apply in face-to-face relationships and larger groups. Future 
research should examine the effects of rewards on trust in these contexts.  
Managerial Implications  
The findings in this article should be useful to managers who are interested in changing trust levels 
within their organizations, and also to managers who are interested in anticipating the effects of planned 
reward changes. From a managerial perspective, reward systems are a potentially useful tool because 
they are present in essentially all work organizations, management at some level of the organization 
typically has at least some ability to modify rewards, and rewards can often be modified on a system-wide 
basis, or on a more targeted basis. Our analyses, combined with prior research, suggest that managers can 
expect rewards to have strong, predictable effects on interpersonal trust. Yet our analyses also suggest 
that, rather than having a straightforward, direct effect on trust, rewards appear to affect trust by 
influencing individuals’ perceptions about each others’ motives, their perceptions of joint performance, and 
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their evaluations of their own behavior based on those reward structures. Thus, we expect that our 
findings will help managers better understand how rewards influence trust, and better anticipate some of 
the other important consequences of reward changes that are related to trust. Lastly, in cases in which 
managers are unable (e.g., due to collective bargaining) or unwilling to use reward systems to change trust 
levels, our mediation analysis suggests alternate perceptual routes through which trust levels may be 
changed.
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Table 1. 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
Variable  M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Trust 24.95 7.89 .95       
2. Initial trust condition  .00 1.00 .36 -       
3. Reward (competitive) .02 .81 -.24 .00 -        
4. Reward (cooperative) .04 .82 .16 -.03 .48 -       
5. Partner’s information 
sharing 
2.16 1.46 .12 .01 -.22 .12 -      
6. Partner’s lying .52 1.11 -.01 -.05 .34 -.07 -.31 -     
7. Perceived motives 19.94 5.69 .69 .20 -.34 .10 .11 .02 .89    
8. Own information 
sharing 
2.40 1.21 .48 .04 -.12 .29 .30 -.07 .44 -   
9. Own lying .63 1.19 -.45 -.14 .28 -.17 -.14 .11 -.41 -.41 -  
10.Perceived 
performance 
9.86 3.27 .71 .30 -.39 .10 .21 -.09 .77 .41 -.45 .91 
11. Actual performance 17.25 6.03 .35 .02 -.34 .24 .48 -.48 .37 .47 -.47 .52 
N  =  112. Sample sizes in each reward condition are: competitive/high trust = 19, competitive/low trust = 18, mixed/high trust = 18,  
mixed/low trust = 17, cooperative/high trust = 19, cooperative/low trust = 21. Correlations greater than or equal to |.20| are significant at  
the .05 level, correlations greater than or equal to |.24| are significant at the .01 level, and correlations greater than or equal to |.30| are  
significant at the .001 level. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are presented on the diagonal where applicable.
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Table 2. 
Summary of Regression Analyses a 
Step Dependent Variable Independent Variable ß t R2 F 
1a Partner’s information sharing Reward (competitive) -.36 -3.55*** .12 4.88*** 
  Reward (cooperative) .30 2.95**   
1b Partner’s lying Reward (competitive) .48 4.88*** .19 8.24*** 
  Reward (cooperative) -.30 -3.00**   
1c Perceived motives Reward (competitive) -.51 -5.34*** .25 11.93*** 
  Reward (cooperative) .35 3.63***   
1d Own information sharing Reward (competitive) -.34 -3.43*** .18 7.83*** 
  Reward (cooperative) .46 4.61***   
1e Own lying Reward (competitive) .47 4.81*** .22 9.88*** 
  Reward (cooperative) -.39 -4.05***   
1f Perceived performance Reward (competitive) -.36 -3.68*** .42 19.73*** 
  Reward (cooperative) .20 2.08*   
2 Trust Initial trust condition .37 4.58*** .29 14.83*** 
  Reward (competitive) -.41 -4.48***   
  Reward (cooperative) .37 4.04***   
3 Trust Initial trust condition .18 2.71** .63 17.39*** 
  Reward (competitive) -.03 -.35   
  Reward (cooperative) .08 .91   
  Partner’s information sharing -.04 -.49   
  Partner’s lying .02 .25   
  Perceived motives .27 2.68**   
  Own information sharing .19 2.54*   
  Own lying -.09 -1.19   
  Perceived performance .37 3.35***   
4 Trust Initial trust condition .17 2.56* .65 15.13*** 
  Reward (competitive) -.02 -.23   
  Reward (cooperative) .07 .81   
  Partner’s information sharing -.03 -.45   
  Partner’s lying .03 .41   
  Perceived motives .22 2.19*   
  Own information sharing .20 2.67**   
  Own lying -.09 -1.23   
  Perceived performance .41 3.72***   
  Initial trust x Reward (competitive) -.09 -1.24   
  Initial trust x Reward (cooperative) .14 2.00*   
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a To conserve space, variables not central to the hypotheses were excluded from the table. Other variables included in the analyses  
are as follows: step 1a: Initial trust condition (ß = .02); step 1b: Initial trust condition (ß = -.06); step 1c: Initial trust condition  
(ß = .21*); step 1d: Initial trust condition (ß = .06); step 1e: Initial trust condition (ß = -.15); step 1f: Initial trust condition (ß = 
.30***), Actual performance (ß = .34***); step 3: Actual performance (ß = -.08); step 4: Actual performance (ß = -.06). 
*p < .05.  **p < .01.  ***p < .001. 
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Perceived Performance
Own Lying
Own Information Sharing
Perceived Motives
Competitive Rewards
Cooperative Rewards
Trust
Initial Trust Condition
.35***
-.39***
-.51***
.20*
.47***
-.34***
-.36***
-.09
.46***
.19*
.37***
.27**
(.37***)   .18**
(.37*** )   .08
(-.41*** ) -.03
Figure 1. Summary of Mediated Effects of Reward Structures on Trust
Partner’s Lying
Partner’s Information 
Sharing.30**
-.30**
-.36***
.48***
-.04
.02
Performance
-.08
 
 
 
Notes. To reduce complexity, the figure presents only the mediation hypotheses (steps 1-3 from Table 2). Effects coding reduces the three reward conditions 
(cooperative, mixed and competitive) to two variables. Hence the mixed reward condition is not shown.  The numbers in parentheses indicate the direct effect of the 
predictor and control variables on the criterion prior to inclusion of the mediators in the regression equation.   
*p < .05 **p < .01. *** p < .001.  
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Appendix  
 
Survey Itemsa 
 
Reward structure manipulation check 
 
My score is based on: (a) the accuracy of my individual ranking, compared to the accuracy of my 
partner’s individual ranking; (b) the accuracy of my team’s ranking, compared to the accuracy of the 
average team; (c) both a & b; (d) other (please specify)____________________. 
 
This scoring system suggests that in order for me to obtain a high score: (a) my individual ranking must be 
accurate and my partner’s individual ranking must be significantly less accurate; (b) my team’s ranking 
must be very accurate as compared to the average team; (c) both a & b; (d) other (please 
specify)____________________. 
 
Trust (Used for manipulation check, and also to measure interpersonal trust after the wilderness survival 
task) 
 
I feel that my partner is straight with me in the information she or he provides. 
I feel that I cannot depend on my partner. (R)  
I think my partner represents information inaccurately. (R) 
I think that my partner’s behavior lets me down as a teammate. (R) 
I feel my partner takes advantage of the fact that I lack complete information in this project. (R) 
 
Perceived motives 
 
Our goals were incompatible with each other. (R) 
We had a ‘win-lose’ relationship. (R) 
Our goals went together. 
We wanted each other to succeed. 
 
Perceived performance 
 
We (my partner and I) produced a quality solution on the team ranking. 
I am satisfied with our team’s decision.  
 
 
 
a Trust, perceived motives, and perceived performance were measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale with 
endpoints of “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.” The reward structure manipulation check used the multiple 
choice format shown.  
 
 
